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The study examines the relationship between corruption and economic growth in the Nigeria economy for 
sample periods ranging from 1970 to 2004. Johansen’s maximum likelihood cointegration techniques 
and Granger causality tests were applied to annual, national-level data. The results of this study indicate 
that corruption is cointegrated with Economic growth in Nigeria. In addition, for Nigeria, the study 
found a one-way causality from corruption to economic growth. These findings provide a statistical 
confirmation of unfavorable effects of corruption on economic performance as widely hypothesized in 
economic literature. For policy, the results of this study suggest that the current anti corruption drive in 
the country should be more vigorously pursued as this result indicated that it has important consequence 




orruption is a modern scourge that has become endemic in many societies, both developed and 
underdeveloped. Corruption is one of the most harmful phenomena of the age, its devastating 
social consequences threatening the safety and security of peoples, states and democratic 
institutions. This becomes more worrisome for most countries of Sub Saharan African (SSA) with 
reputation for enshrined institutionalized corruption that has become widespread to the extent that it is no 
longer considered an exception but the rule.  The Nigeria economy has a reputation of being corrupt. 
Transparency International (TI) rated Nigeria the world’s third most corrupt nation; it as well accused the 
country of being on the lead of African nations allegedly slowing down the fight against corruption in the 
continent.  Raymond Baker, in a paper Money Laundering and Flight Capital: The Impact on Private 
Banking, wrote: “the biggest single thief in the world in the 1990s was almost certainly the late military 
dictator, Sane Abacha, with $12 to $16 billion passing out of Nigeria in corrupt and tax evading money 
during his murderous five year regime.”  Startling revelations of corrupt practices by key operators at all 
levels and arms of current Nigeria’s fledging democracy point to the fact that corruption still poses 
serious threat to national survival. 
C
 
The purpose of this paper is to seek an empirical understanding and an addition to current literature on the 
association between corruption and economic growth by using cointegration analyses to examine the 
relationship between these phenomenons in Nigeria. This method is quite common in the area of 
economics and finance in general, but has not been applied extensively to the study of corruption. In 
addition, causality tests will be performed to the Nigerian economy data to examine a causal link between 
corruption and economic growth. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section two provides an outline of theoretical linkages 
between corruption and economic growth. It also contains a review of relevant empirical literature in the 
area. Section three examines definitional and measurement issues in empirical analyses of corruption. An 
operational measure of capital flight as a proxy for corruption in the Nigerian economy used in the study 
is also described in section three. Section four set out the methodological framework for the study. The 
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framework established in section four is subjected to econometric analysis in section five and section six 
concluded with summary and policy implications of the main findings. 
 
 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
Much of the concern over corruption in recent years has dealt with its effects upon economic 
development; hence, literature is replete with theoretical and empirical evidences on the relationship 
between corruption and economic growth. The general conclusion is that corruption slows down the long-
term growth of an economy through a wide range of channels.  Corruption is both a tax and source of 
uncertainty to investment decisions, and both diminish incentives to invest.  Businesspersons interpret 
corruption as a species of tax. This is because they are often aware that a bribe is required before an 
enterprise can be started and, in addition, corrupt officials may also lay claims to  part of the proceeds 
from the investment. In addition, since corruption is shrouded in secrecy, they face the uncertainty that 
the corrupt official will not fulfill his part of the bargain. Mauro (1995) presents some strong empirical 
evidence to help prove the negative relationship between corruption and long-term growth. Wei (1997) 
argues that corruption is much more costly than ordinary taxes because it generates uncertainty in 
addition to the tax burden. 
 
Corruption is a form of seeking economic rents by creating artificial limitations.  Every day private firms 
spend vast amounts of money attempting to convince legislators to grant monopolies or otherwise restrict 
competition so that some industry or individual can realize a rent. Throughout the world bureaucrats and 
people in authority are indefatigably maneuvering to position themselves in a tiny monopoly where they 
can be bribed for issuing a license, approving an expenditure, or allowing a shipment across a border. 
Studies have shown that these rent-seeking activities exact a heavy economic and social toll. Since rent 
seeking is often more lucrative than productive work, talents will be misallocated. Financial incentives 
may lure the more talented and better educated to engage in rent seeking rather than productive work, 
which in turn results in adverse consequences for the country's economic growth. Ehrlich and Lui (1999) 
present a balanced growth model to show that in some equilibrium officials spend a substantial amount of 
time and effort in seeking and accumulating political capital, which is not socially productive.  
One specific channel through which corruption may harm economic performance is by distorting the 
composition of government expenditure. Corrupt politicians may be expected to spend more public 
resources on those items on which it is easier to exact large bribes and keep them secret, for example, 
items produced in markets where the degree of competition is low and items whose value is difficult to 
monitor. Corrupt politicians might therefore be more inclined to spend on fighter aircraft and large-scale 
investment projects than on textbooks and teachers' salaries, even though the latter may promote 
economic growth largely than the former. Mauro (1998) concludes that corruption affects the composition 
of government expenditure. When corruption is serious, there is much less government expenditure on 
education than on large infrastructure and defense projects. In addition, Mauro finds that corruption also 
lowers the quality of infrastructure projects and pubic services.  
 
Definitional and Measurement Issues 
 
Corruption is an illicit activity and hence is difficult to define, conceptualize, and measure. Corruption is 
defined in the literature in a variety of ways. When viewed from the perspective of public interest, 
corruption is defined as "the abuse of public power for private gain." From the political-economy angle, it 
is described as  “charging of a price for the provision of a public service in excess of the official tariff.” 
When corruption is viewed as a behavioral phenomenon, it is defined as engaging in activities deemed 
illegal by society. Thus it becomes difficult to reduce the phenomenon to a single definition as it covers 
such a vast and growing assortment of activities which may include, but are not limited to, drugs 
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trafficking, money laundering, corporate crime, arms sales, sex trade and abuse, art and antique fraud, 
human trafficking, capital flight, etc. The only common denominator linking these activities together is 
that they are all undertaken outside the legality of the system. 
 
Corruption is a classic example of an observable phenomenon that is not quantifiable since there cannot 
be statistics on a phenomenon, which by its very nature is concealed. Corruption is usually a clandestine 
activity and frequently does not have a direct victim. Moreover, those with knowledge of a corrupt act 
generally have an interest in concealing it. A related complication, as argued by Rose-Ackerman (1999) 
and Lamsdoff (1999), has to do with what is meant by “levels” of corruption. Is it the number of corrupt 
actions over time, the size of the stakes involved or the level of government at which they occur? For 
these reason corruption remains impossible to measure directly.  
 
Attempts to measure corruption have involved several approaches. These include perception-based 
corruption indices, which draw upon opinion surveys and expert estimates of how corrupt various 
countries are. This index is widely associated with the Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index (Transparency International, 2001). Schlessinger and Meir (2002) made comparisons 
based upon arrest or conviction data for corruption offences. PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2001), provides 
an hybrid approach, known as the “Opacity Index”, which incorporates a multi-component indices 
perceptual ratings of hard economic and social data and indicators such as interest premiums paid on 
sovereign debt by nations with transparency problems.  
 
While these perceptual scales have helped in understanding the cause and effects of corruption, as well as 
put pressure on governments and society to address the corruption problem, they are obviously imperfect 
owing to their subjective nature. Perception data are just estimates of how corrupt a society are thought to 
be, and are thus open to influence and distortion from full range of factors affecting any human 
judgments. The more obvious limitation of these data sets is that it treats whole societies as units of 
analysis, and thus it becomes far removed from analysis that have specific country or provinces as focus. 
There are no obvious answers to these problems, yet finding useful ways to compare level of corruption 
over time remains a necessity for an empirical focused study such as the present study that need good data 
for building models and testing hypotheses. 
 
The Measure of Corruption Used in This Study 
 
To address the problems highlighted in the previous section, this paper adopts the residual method 
estimates of capital flight as a proxy for corruption in Nigeria. Klitgaard, Maclean-Abaroa and Parris 
(2000) contend that the most useful approach in measuring corruption is to track changes in aspects of 
governance that create incentives for corruption, or reveal its effects or both. One such incentive in Africa 
is the globalization of markets and developmental inequalities that have engendered cross-border 
corruption involving international interests, actors, capital and economic processes. Ample empirical 
evidence has demonstrated that incentives for cross-border corruption in form of illegal external capital / 
asset accumulation, or what economists term capital flight is associated with large-scale corruption among 
African leaders. Bardhan, (1997) opined that it is plausible that certain types of capital flight, defined as 
transfer of money abroad, usually in US dollars, often under questionable circumstances are functions of 
the government, or worse still governmental corruption. 
 
Boyce and Ndikumana (2002) noted that in most African countries, instead of financing investment or 
consumption with public funds, a substantial fraction was captured by African political elites and 
channeled abroad in the form of capital flight. Through this process public funds, as well as public 
external debts (contracted via borrowing by African government or by private firms with government 
guarantees) were transformed into private external assets. Activities and actions of political office 
holders, especially the military elites, in Nigeria in the last three decades perfectly fits in the mechanisms 
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by which resources are channeled abroad as capital flight. These include embezzlement of borrowed 
funds, kickbacks on government contracts, trade mis-invoicing, misappropriation of revenues from state-
owned enterprises and smuggling of natural resources. As the government they headed incurred large 
external debts, a number of individual military rulers amassed large personal fortunes. A substantial part 
of which were held abroad. For instance, the Swiss bank accounts of the family of General Sani Abacha, 
who ruled Nigeria for five years, reportedly contain as much as $2billion US dollars at the time it was 
frozen in 1999 (Onishi, 1999). In addition, a US Senate enquiry in the same year revealed that the Abacha 
family also held multi-million dollar accounts with Citibank in London and New York (Gerth, 1999; 
O’Brien, 1999). 
 
The residual method measures capital flight indirectly by comparing the sources of capital inflows (i.e. 
net increases in external debt and the net inflow of foreign investment) with the uses of these inflows (i.e., 
the current account deficit and additions to foreign reserves). This approach starts from the standard 
balance of payments framework. In principle, if the balance of payments statistics were to be used 
(reported by the International Monetary Fund Balance of Payments Statistics), the uses and sources of 
funds should be equal. However, since these statistics may not accurately measure flows, and in particular 
private capital flows, World Bank statistics on the change in the external debt are used instead. If the 
sources, calculated by using World Bank debt data, exceed the uses of capital inflows, the difference is 
termed as capital flight. The residual method acknowledges the difficulties of separating abnormal from 
normal capital outflows and, therefore, measures all unrecorded private capital outflows as being capital 
flight. 
 
According to the residual method, capital flight is calculated as follows: 
   
KFr = )ED + FI – CAD – )FR         (1) 
 
where KFr is capital flight according to the residual method, ) denotes change, ED is stock of gross 
external debt reported in the World Bank data, FI is the net foreign investment inflows, CAD is the 
current account deficit and FR is the stock of official foreign reserves. Annual data series on these 
variables for the period 1970 to 2004 are sourced from International Financial Statistics (IFS) publications 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
 
 
METHODOLOGY, DATA AND ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES 
 
We set out a simple model to test for the existence of any long-run relationship and potential causality 
between corruption and GDP growth rate.  Equation 2 specifies our simple model:  
 
LRGDP = α + βLCORt +Ut           (2) 
 
Where LRGDP denotes the logarithm of real GDP, α and β are estimated constants and LCOR is the 
logarithms of the capital flight proxy for corruption estimated from equation (1). For modeling purposes, 
the variables are in natural logarithms; thus, the first differences can be interpreted as the rate of growth.  
 
The study analyzes the link between corruption and economic growth in a time series data of Nigeria for 
the 1970-2004 periods, via the cointegration tests and granger causality analyses. The data on corruption 
is proxy by an estimate of capital flight flows from Nigeria. The data, sources and estimates of capital 
flight are as presented in section 3.1. Economic growth is proxy by the percentage rate of growth of real 
gross domestic product. Data on this variable is sourced from Statistical Bulletin publications of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria.  
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Co-integration analysis provides potential information about the long-term equilibrium relationship of the 
model. It is now widely recognized following Granger and Newbold (1974) that most economic series 
exhibit a non-stationary (unit-root) pattern in their levels, i.e. the means and variances are time dependent 
and such variables are said to be I(1) (Holdenand Perman, 1994). The implication is that all computed 
statistics in a regression model, which use these means and variances are also time dependent. It implies 
that such variables fail to converge to their true values as the sample size increases (Rao, 1994). If, after 
differencing, the variables become stationary then they are referred to as being I(0). The technique of co-
integration is not only essential, but also necessary in estimating an equilibrium relationship with unit root 
or non-stationary variables to determine the presence of a long-run relationship. 
 
Appropriate tests to determine whether a time series is integrated of order one against the alternative of 
zero order integration include those developed by Fuller (1976), Dickey and Fuller (1981), Phillips 
(1987), and Perron (1988) and others. In addition, there are various approaches to estimating 
cointegrating regressions. Two broad approaches are available: (a) Engle-Granger (1987), (b) Johansen 
(1988), and Johansen-Juselius (1990). The approach developed by Johansen (1988) and Johansen-Juselius 
(1990), which is based on the full information Johansen Maximum Likelihood method (JML) is preferred 
and used in this study. The first approach is popular due to its simplicity and ease of calculation. 
However, there are some problems with the Engle and Granger (1987) procedure. With the Engle-
Granger approach, the estimation of the long-run equilibrium regression requires that the researcher 
place’ one variable on the left-hand side and use the other as regressors. For example, in the case of two 
variables, it is possible to run the Engle-Granger test for co-integration by using the residuals from either 
of the following two 'equilibrium' regressions: 
  
yt + β10 + β11zt + e1t  and  zt + β20 + β21yt + e2t. 
 
However, a problem arises from finite samples. As the sample size increases, asymptotic theory indicates 
that the test for a unit root in the first error sequence becomes equivalent to the test for a unit root in the 
second error sequence (Enders, 1995). Furthermore, it is possible to find that one regression indicates the 
variables are co-integrated, whereas reversing the order indicates no cointegration (Enders, 1995). The 
VAR approach considers this possibility and treats all variables as potentially endogenous. Moreover, 
recent Monte Carlo evidence strongly favors the Johansen Maximum Likelihood method (JML) approach 
over the Engle-Granger’s (Dejong, 1992).  The Hypothesis is that “If variables are co-integrated, they 
share a long-run relationship and will move closely together over time.” 
 
Johansen's approach is to estimate the Vector Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) by maximum 
likelihood, under various assumptions about the trend or intercept parameters and the number r of 
cointegrating vectors, and then conduct likelihood ratio tests. Assuming that the VECM errors Ut are 
independent Nk[0,S] distribution, and given the cointegrating restrictions on the trend or intercept 
parameters, the maximum likelihood Lmax(r) is a function of the cointegration rank r. Johansen proposes 
two types of tests for r:  
 
The lamda-max test: This test is based on the log-likelihood ratio ln[Lmax(r)/Lmax(r+1)], and is 
conducted sequentially for r = 0,1,..,k-1. The name comes from the fact that the test statistic 
involved is a maximum generalized eigenvalue. This test tests the null hypothesis that the 
cointegration rank is equal to r against the alternative that the cointegration rank is equal to r+1. 
 
The trace test: This test is based on the log-likelihood ratio ln[Lmax(r)/Lmax(k)], and is conducted 
sequentially for r = k-1,...,1,0. The name comes from the fact that the test statistic involved is the 
trace (= the sum of the diagonal elements) of a diagonal matrix of generalized eigenvalues. This 
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test tests the null hypothesis that the cointegration rank is equal to r against the alternative that the 
cointegration rank is k. The latter implies that Xt is trend stationary. 
 
Both tests have non-standard asymptotic null distributions. Moreover, given the cointegration rank r 
Johansen also derives likelihood ratio tests of the cointegrating restrictions on the intercept or trend 
parameters.  
 
In addition to cointegration analyses, this study also conducts the Granger causality tests of the same 
variables to detect any causal link between economic performance and corruption. Traditionally, causality 
tests between two stationary series are based on Granger's (1969) definition for causality. Formally, series 
yt “Granger-causes” series xt if series xt can be predicted better by using past values of series yt than by 
using only the historical values of series xt. In other words, yt fails to Granger-cause xt if, for all s > 0, the 
conditional probability distribution of xt+s given (xt, xt-1,...) is the same as the conditional probability 
distribution of xt+s given both (xt, xt-1,...) and (yt, yt-1,...). That is, yt does not Granger-cause xt if : Pr(xt+s|Xt,-
l) = Pr(xt+s|Xt,-l,Yt,-l) where Pr(·) denotes conditional probability, Xt,-l ? (xt, xt-1,..., xt-l) and Yt,-l ? (yt, yt-1,..., 
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where a0 and a1 are constants, ai, bi, ci, and di are parameters, and ut and vt are uncorrelated error terms 
with zero means and finite variances. The null hypothesis that yt (xt) does not Granger-cause xt (yt) is 
rejected if the bi (ci) coefficients are jointly significantly different from zero, using a standard F test. Bi-
directional causality (or feedback) exists if both the bi and ci coefficients are jointly different from zero. 
 
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
 
Unit Roots Tests  
 
Before we estimate the equation, we determine the underlying properties of process that generate our time 
series variables, that is, a test of the stationary properties of the variables. Macroeconomic data often 
appear to possess stochastic trend that can be removed by differencing the variables. We use the 
Augumented Dickey Fuller (ADF) t-test for testing the order of integration. Assuming there is no trend, 
the ADF test can be formulated as follows: 






y y y eδ δ− −
=
Δ = + Δ +∑ 5
The null hypothesis being tested is that ∗ = 0 (random walk with a drift) against the alternative of 
stationarity. The results are as presented in Table 1. As shown in the table, the ADF test indicated that our 
series are non-stationary at their levels. However, all the first differenced series turn out to be stationary at 
the 5% level of significance, the critical value computed by McKinnon is -3.02. All the first differenced 
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Table 1: Augmented Dickey Fuller Test of Unit Roots 
  
Variables ADF Test Statistics 
A. Series in Levels 
     RGDP 




   B. Series in First Differences 
        RGDP 




 ADF is the Augmented Dickey- Fuller test; it gives the t-statistics from a specification that includes a constant, trend and two (2) lagged changes 
in the dependent variable. A * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis (  = 0) of non-stationarity at the 5% level of significance. MacKinnon 
critical value for rejection of a unit root for ADF at 5% is -3.02. 
 
Tests for Cointegration 
 
We employed the Johansen Cointegration test to check for cointegration among the time series. This 
become necessary because our variables contain unit roots in the level, cointegration is the appropriate 
dynamic modeling technique for them. A linear combination of these variables is identified such that this 
combination is stationary. If such combination exists, then the variables are said to be cointegrated. If 
variables are co-integrated, they share a long-run relationship and will move closely together over time. 
This means that the difference between such variables was stable over time and there is some degree of 
convergence in the long run. The estimation of a VAR model requires the explicit choice of lag length in 
the equation of the model. Following Judge et.al (1988), Akaike’s AIC criterion was used to determine 
the lag length of the VAR model. The chosen lag length is one that minimized the following: AIC(n) = 
lndetΣn + { 2d2n}/ T…where  d is number of variables, T is the sample size, and Σn is the estimate of the 
residuals of the variance-covariance matrix obtained with a VAR. The model that minimized AIC turns 
out to be the one with 2 lag lengths. It is hypothesized that there exists a long-run relationship between 
real GDP and corruption proxied with the residual estimate of capital flight from the Nigerian economy. 
 
The results of the test are as shown in Table 2 below.  Panel A reports the so-called trace statistics, while 
Panel B reports the maximal eigenvalue statistics. The first column shows the number of cointegration 
relations under the null hypothesis, the second is the ordered eigenvalue of the II matrix, the third column 
is the trace statistic, and the last columns are the 5% and 1% critical values. It should be noted that the 
(nonstandard) critical values are taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992), which differ slightly from those 
reported in Johansen and Juselius (1990). The trace statistic tests the null hypothesis of r cointegrating 
relations against the alternative of k cointegrating relations, where k is the number of endogenous 
variables, for R = 0, 1,….., K – 1. Using these trace statistic, we test for the number of co-integrating 
relationship between LRGDP and LCOR. Given that we only have two variables, we expect that at least 
one cointegrating vector is present.  
 
To test the null hypothesis r =zero against the general alternative r =1, or 2 we use the λ-trace statistic and 
the Eigen value. Since the null hypothesis is r=0 and there are two variables (i.e. n =2), the summation in 
the estimated equations runs from 1 to 2. The calculated value for the trace statistics is 19.95054 and 
comparing this calculated values to the critical values provided by Johansen and Juselius (1990), the null 
hypothesis of cointegration can be accepted at both 5% and 1% critical levels. Thus, at the 90% level, the 
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Table 2: Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test 
 
Panel A:  Trace Statistics 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace Statistics 5 Percent Critical Value 1 Percent Critical Value 
None*  0.384686  19.95054  15.41  20.04 
At Most 1 *  0.183172 19.95054   3.76   6.65 
Panel B:  Maximal Eigenvalue Statistics 
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace Statistics 5 Percent Critical Value 1 Percent Critical Value 
None*  0.384686  19.95054  14.07 18.63 
At Most 1 *  0.183172  5.867474   3.76   6.65 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at 5% (1%) significance level. Trace statistics indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% (1%) 
significance level. Max-Eigen Statistic indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at 5% significance level 
 
Since the trace test has a very general alternative hypothesis, we need to test a more specific hypothesis. 
To do so, we apply the lambda-maximal test. Here we test the null hypothesis r=0 against the specific 
alternative of  r=1. The calculated and critical values for n-r =2 is as shown in the table. The null 
hypothesis of cointegration can still be accepted at both 5% and 1% critical levels. 
 
As reported in Table 2 above, both the trace and the maximal eigenvalues statistics show that the VAR 
has two cointegrating vectors. This implies that a long run relationship exists among the variables. Hence, 
the second cointegrating vector is normalized as the growth of real GDP. Thus, the result of the 
cointegrating vector is given as: 
   
RGDP = 2.45 + 0.18COR 
         (0.261) 
 
The standard error is indicated in parenthesis. The cointegrating vector indicated that long-run growth of 
real GDP in Nigeria is negatively and significantly related to levels of corruption. The coefficient 
suggests that an increase of corruption level by 1 million Naira would reduce economic growth by 18%. 
This finding provides statistical confirmation of the hypothesized negative impact of corruption on 
growth in economic literature. 
 
Granger Causality Tests 
 
The Granger causality test requires that all data series involved are stationary. Otherwise, the inference 
from the F-statistic might be spurious because the test will have nonstandard distributions. As shown in 
Table 1, both the real GDP and corruption series are shown to be I(1). Accordingly, the first-difference 
series are used to perform the Granger causality tests. The results of the tests are reported in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Granger Causality Tests Results 
 
Dependent Variable F-Statistics 
Corruption 1.079 
Economic growth 5.052* 
Reported values are the F-statistics.. 
* Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. 
 
In the corruption equation, there is no causal relationship from economic growth to corruption as the F-
statistic was insignificant. In the long run, there is unidirectional causality running from corruption to 
economic growth as evidenced by statistical significance of F-statistic of the economic growth equation as 
shown in Table 3 above. Thus, it can be concluded that for Nigeria data, there is uni-directional causality 
between corruption and economic growth and the causal direction runs from corruption to economic 
growth. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
A burgeoning empirical literature suggests that the absence of corruption accelerate economic growth, 
while anecdotal evidences confirmed that corruption is endemic in the Nigeria socio-economic and 
political polity. This paper therefore seeks an empirical understanding of the association between 
corruption and economic growth in Nigeria. We achieved this by applying Johansen’s maximum 
likelihood cointegration method and Granger causality test for corruption and economic growth 
indices from the Nigerian economy, for sample periods from 1970 to 2004.  
  
Both the trace and the maximal eigenvalues statistics show that a long run relationship exists between 
corruption and economic growth indices in Nigeria. The cointegrating vector indicated that long-run 
growth of real GDP in Nigeria is negatively and significantly related to levels of corruption. The 
coefficient suggests that an increase of corruption level by one million Naira would reduce economic 
growth by 18%. This finding provides statistical confirmation of the hypothesized negative impact of 
corruption on growth in economic literature. 
 
The Granger causality tests support uni-directional causality between corruption and economic growth 
and the causal direction runs from corruption to economic growth to further lend credence to the results 
from cointegration analyses.  
 
These findings provide empirical support for the postulates of negative growth impact of corruption on 
growth as contained in theoretical and empirical literature. Furthermore, the results of this study appear to 
suggest that cointegration analysis may be a fruitful way to investigate the issue. For policy, the results of 
this study suggest that the current anti corruption drive in the country should be pursued very vigorously 
as this result indicated that it has important consequence on economic growth aspirations of the country. 
The creation of popular expectations about standards of public service and the right to be free of 
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